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STATUTORY TEXTS AS INSTANCES OF 
LANGUAGE(S): CONSEQUENCES AND 
LIMITATIONS ON INTERPRETATION 
Jan Engberg∗  
I.  INTRODUCTION 
s a linguist and a translator working especially on texts    
and communication in legal settings, my main interest in 
statutory interpretation in multilingual settings concerns the 
ontological status of statutory texts.  My basic assumption, 
based on results from modern research in cognitively oriented 
text linguistics, is that legal texts are perfectly normal texts 
subject to the characteristics of  human communication (contex-
tuality, cotextuality of meaning, as well as pragmatic fuzzyness) 
and are not logic constructs subject to logical operations.1  Con-
sequently, interpretation of such texts does not differ in sub-
stance from the interpretation process carried out in other 
kinds of textual communication.  In this paper I will concen-
trate on the consequences of this basic assumption upon the 
feasibility and methodology of statutory interpretation within 
the European Union.2  I will thus mainly look at statutory in-
terpretation in a specialized (viz. multilingual) context.  How-
ever, I shall also try to show some of the general consequences 
to be drawn for all statutory interpretation. 
  
 ∗   Jan Engberg is an Associate Professor at the Aarhus School of Busi-
ness, Denmark. 
 1. Marcelo Dascal & Jerzy Wróblewski, The Rational Law-Maker and the 
Pragmatics of Legal Interpretation, 15 J. PRAGMATICS 421, 431 (1991). 
 2. The European Union is a prime example for analysis due to its trans-
lated texts and dogmatic belief that every text be seen and interpreted as an 
authentic original.  For example, the Treaty on European Union lays down in 
Article 53 that all its language versions are equally authentic.  TREATY OF 
AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES 
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CERTAIN RELATED ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, 
O.J. (C340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]; and Regulation No 1 
from 1958 states in article four that  “Regulations and other documents of 
general application shall be drafted in the four official languages.”  EEC 
Council: Regulation No. 1 Determining the Languages to be Used by the 
European Economic Community, art. 4, 1958 J.O. (B017) 385.  The word used 
here is drafted, not translated, as all versions are to be seen as authentic. 
A 
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Before going deeper into the matter, let me dwell a moment 
on my role as a linguist and a translator in the context of an 
inherently legal field like the description of statutory interpre-
tation. I see my role to be what Professor Lawrence Solan3 has 
called a “tour guide.”  Professor Solan talks about the role of 
linguists in the courtroom, identifying where the linguist’s ex-
pertise is relevant (in explaining the limitations as to interpre-
tation that the language system poses) and where it is not (of-
fering expert opinions on which meaning alternative is the best 
or most correct).4  Accordingly, my intention is not to explain to 
lawyers how they have to interpret statutes in multilingual set-
tings or how specific statutes should have been interpreted in 
earlier instances.  This would be outside the boundaries of my 
expertise.  Instead, I want to offer a linguist’s perspective on the 
inherently language-dependent activity of statutory interpreta-
tion.  This focus gives the reader an insight into what this activ-
ity looks like from a linguist’s point of view, that is, a guided 
tour through the linguistic part of the landscape of statutory 
interpretation in multilingual settings. 
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND MEANING ASSUMPTIONS 
A.  Basic assumptions  
Statutory interpretation is about finding the right or relevant 
meaning of words or phrases in cases where there is “doubt due 
to lack of the necessary clarity or transparency required for the 
application of the law.”5  In linguistic terms, such an operation 
necessarily involves the question of how mutual understanding 
develops,6 and this paper will be centered around approaches to 
monitor the details of problems arising from this question.  
In standard statutory interpretation within a unilingual legal 
system like the Danish or that of the U.S., the problem or chal-
lenge is to interpret a word or a phrase in a statute expressed in 
one language and embedded in some (general or specialized) 
  
 3. Lawrence M. Solan, Linguistic Experts as Semantic Tour Guides, 5 
FORENSIC LINGUISTICS 88, 94 (1994) [hereinafter Linguistic Experts]. 
 4. Id. at 97–98. 
 5. Dascal & Wróblewski, supra note 1, at 428 (discussing judicial opera-
tive interpretation).  
 6. Id. at 423–427.  
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interpretive context.   A part of the context that greatly impacts 
the process of reaching mutual understanding is exactly the fact 
that only one language is involved in this process.  Discussions 
among specialists may therefore be centered around questions 
like “What kind of sources may be drawn upon (own intuition, 
dictionaries, linguistic expertise)?” and “What role does the in-
terpreter himself or herself and the consequently necessary sub-
jectivity play in this connection?” 
In statutory interpretation in an EU context, the central 
problem is the same (interpreting words or phrases by reaching 
a mutual understanding), but it is aggravated by the fact that 
not only one, but normally eleven languages are involved.7  
Thus, not only do we have the discussion among people speak-
ing the same mother tongue about how a word may be inter-
preted, but on top of these problems we have different language 
systems in which meaning is generally distributed differently. 
So it is very difficult to achieve texts in all eleven languages, in 
which every word or small phrase has exactly the same mean-
ing and implications.  The court system, naturally, has a num-
ber of ways to cope with these challenges, but whether we judge 
these as efficient or not is connected to the question of how we 
conceptualize the process of achieving mutual understanding, 
as we shall see below.  
As an example of the kind of task with which statutory inter-
pretation is confronted in an EU context, we may look at a case 
treated by the European Court in 1985.8  In the spring of 1980, 
British trawlers sailed into a fishing zone in the Baltic Sea out-
side Polish territorial waters where the Polish government 
claimed exclusive fishing rights.9  The British trawlers cast 
empty nets in this zone, which were taken over by Polish trawl-
ers.10  The Polish vessels trawled the nets, but did not take them 
out of the water at any time.11  Likewise, they did not enter Pol-
ish territorial water.  Instead, when the trawl was completed 
the ends of the nets were handed over to the British trawlers.12  
  
 7. TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 2, at art. 53. 
 8. Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, 1985 E.C.R. 1169.  
 9. Id. § 2. 
 10. Id. § 3. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
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The contents of the nets were taken aboard the British trawl-
ers, which then took the fish to the UK.13  The European Com-
mission wanted the trawlers to pay customs duty on the catch, 
on the grounds that the fish had been caught by the Polish 
trawlers and therefore stemmed from outside the EU.14  The 
British trawlers refused to pay the duty because the English 
version of the statutory text relied upon by the European Com-
mission refers to products of sea-fishing and other products 
taken from the sea by vessels registered or recorded in that coun-
try and flying its flag as counting as “goods wholly obtained or 
produced in one country.”15  Their argument was that the deci-
sive action is to take the fish out of the water and therefore fish 
caught under the described circumstances must count as origi-
nating in the UK.16  The main problem was that the majority of 
other language versions use formulations which also (e.g. the 
French version17) or exclusively (e.g. the German version18) con-
centrate on the act of catching the fish, not on the act of taking 
the fish out of the water.  In the end, the Court opted for inter-
preting the English formulation to focus upon the “catch”-
meaning, i.e., focusing on the act of constraining the fish from 
moving freely in the sea. The Court made this determination 
primarily to support the interpretation that was in best accord 
with the purpose and the general scheme of the statute.19  
Later in this paper we shall investigate in more detail the ar-
gumentation of the Court.20  At this stage, the above description 
of the example suffices to show the perspectives of the problem 
with which a multilingual legal system may be confronted:  
  
 13. Id.  
 14. Id. § 5. 
 15. EEC Council: Regulation No. 802/68 of the Council of 27 June 1968 on 
the Common Definition of the Concept of the Origin of Goods, art. 4(1), 1968 
J.O. (L 148) 1.  
 16. Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, supra note 8, § 11.  
 17. French version used “extraits de la mer,” which is capable of meaning 
both ‘taken out of the sea’ and ‘separated from the sea.’  Id. § 15. 
 18. German version used “gefangen,” meaning ‘caught.’  See id. § 15. 
 19. Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, supra note 8, §17.  
 20. See infra Part 3.2. 
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1. The words of the different languages involved do not match 
totally, so a choice between possible meanings from different 
languages must be made.  
2. The different possible meanings are in many cases mutu-
ally incompatible. 
3. Consequently, the Court actually has to instigate a new 
meaning in one or more of the languages. 
Whether these perspectives are seen as problematic depends 
heavily on the role the virtual language system (as opposed to 
the actual language use in communication) is seen to play in 
connection with achieving mutual understanding.  If we look at 
actual communication and cognition (of which statutory inter-
pretation is one type), I opt for attributing a background role to 
the language system.  In short, the main constraint on interpre-
tation methodology stems from the fact that all texts subject to 
real human communication (and consequently also legal texts, 
according to the basic assumption mentioned above) must in-
herently have a certain degree of indeterminacy concerning 
their meaning.21  Statutory interpretation must therefore rely 
on the subjective interpretation of human agents.  In my opin-
ion, the theories and methodologies of statutory interpretation 
must take this subjectivity into consideration with intention to 
secure, on these grounds, the kind of just and justifiable deci-
sions that a modern Western society expects of legal institu-
tions.  
In the following, I will start out by presenting the traditional 
strong language theory and some of the problems that occur, 
when it is confronted with reality.  This leads on to a discussion 
of how specialised meaning may be conceptualised in a Con-
structivist approach and what it means for statutory interpreta-
tion.  A number of approaches relying on weaker language theo-
ries are introduced and their relations to Constructivist think-
ing are investigated.  In the second part of the paper, the basic 
features of statutory interpretation in an EU context are pre-
sented and exemplified in a single case study, and finally some 
consequences of the said and found for the development of a 
multilingual legal system within the EU are outlined. 
  
 21. For details on the background for taking this stand, see infra Part 2.3. 
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B.  The strong language theory  
Not all theories of legal argumentation and statutory inter-
pretation take as their point of departure my basic assumption 
concerning the process of achieving mutual understanding.  The 
traditional assumption about the role of the statute in a code-
based legal system, like that of Germany,22 is that the law is 
encompassed within the statute and the court only has compe-
tence to decide cases, not to set up the standards by which a 
case must be decided.23  The rationale behind this line of 
thought is a desire to live up to the ideal of a just and objective 
legal system.  The basic argumentation runs as follows:  sen-
tences imposed by the court should not be subjective decisions 
at the discretion of the individual judge or judges, but neutral 
and objective decisions made on the basis of facts and rules ex-
isting independently of the deciding judge or judges.24  There-
fore, interpretation of meanings in texts should be based on 
sources lying outside the mind of the judge.25  In this view, 
statutory texts are seen as autonomous entities carrying 
autonomous and determinate meaning, thus being normative in 
their own right.26  This is true for the text as well as for consti-
tutive elements, such as the individual words.  As an important 
methodological consequence of this view, a viable solution when 
interpreting legal texts is to use dictionaries, for example, as an 
instrument in finding normatively prescribed meanings.27 
  
 22. See, e.g., Janice Becker, Retaining Quality Translation Services, 1994 
CHI. B. ASS’N REC. 30, 31. 
 23. Ralph Christensen & Hans Kudlich, Die Auslegungslehre als implizite 
Sprachtheorie der Juristen [Interpretation Theory as Implicit Language 
Theory of Lawyers], in ARCHIV FÜR RECHTS UND SOZIALPHILOSOPHIE [ARCHIVE 
FOR LEGAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY] 230–31 (2002).  
 24. Id. at 232–33. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Ralph Christensen & Michael Sokolowski, Wie normativ ist Sprache? 
Der Richter zwischen Sprechautomat und Sprachgesetzgeber [How Normative 
is Language? The Position of the Judge Between Sentencing Machine and 
Linguistic Legislator], in SPRACHE UND RECHT [LANGUAGE AND LAW] 66–68 
(Ulrike Haß-Zumkehr ed., 2002). 
 27. Id. at 67; Lawrence M. Solan, Ordinary Meaning in Legal Interpreta-
tion, in 2001 PROCEEDINGS FROM THE CONFERENCE  OF LAW AND LANGUAGE – 
PROSPECT AND RETROSPECT 1, 5 (Univ. of Lapland CD-ROM) [hereinafter Or-
dinary Meaning]. 
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While the ideal of autonomous normative text is a tradition 
strongly connected with the code-based German legal system, it 
is not limited to the German system.  Professor Solan cites28 the 
1917 U.S. Supreme Court decision of Caminetti v. United States 
for the following statement: 
It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the 
first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is 
framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the consti-
tutional authority of the law-making body which passed it, the 
sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its 
terms.29 
Here we see the idea of the statutory text and the words con-
tained within as having autonomous and determinate meanings 
sufficient to make it possible to “enforce [them] according to 
[their] terms.”30  Professor Solan points to the so called “New 
Textualism” propagated by Justice Scalia as a recent example of 
a similar approach.31  Thus, rather than being an idea connected 
to code-based and not to common law-based legal systems, the 
idea of the autonomous and determinate meaning of legal texts 
and words contained in such texts is connected to a specific view 
of language, independent of the legal system in which the lan-
guage is used.  Professors Christensen and Sokolowski call this 
“the strong language theory,” as it intends to give the power of 
carrying meaning to language itself and to texts and words 
autonomously.32 
C.  Problems with reality  
When we try to implement this strong language theory to ac-
tual human communication and cognition, however, we encoun-
ter serious problems.  Ferdinand de Saussure, one of the found-
ing fathers of modern linguistics as the study of linguistic struc-
ture, noticed that the language system is not present in actual 
communication.33  Instead, it is an abstract notion, built by each 
  
 28. See Ordinary Meaning, supra note 27, at 5.   
 29. Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Ordinary Meaning, supra note 27, at 5. 
 32. Christensen & Sokolowski, supra note 26, at 65. 
 33. FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS 13 (Charles 
Bally et al. eds., 1983).  
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communicating individual on the basis of experiences with ac-
tual speech: “A language accumulates in our brain only as the 
result of countless experiences. … The impressions we received 
from listening to others modify our own linguistic habits.”34  
However, Saussure still presupposed an approximately identi-
cal system built up in the brain of each language user,35 consti-
tuting the equivalent of an objective meaning existing inde-
pendently of the characteristics of the individual processor.  
This is the central characteristic, and a necessary presupposi-
tion, of the strong theory of language: only if sender and re-
ceiver have near identical systems are they able to understand 
words in the same way.  It is, however, a fairly unlikely constel-
lation.  It is difficult to come up with descriptions of actual lan-
guage acquisition processes that may yield such identical sys-
tems in every communicator.  The problem is that the meaning 
of texts can only exist as a construction in the minds of indi-
viduals, built on the basis of perceived underspecified textual 
signs and existing mental models.  An objective meaning exist-
ing independently of human agents does not seem possible in 
the real world of linguistic practice.  The closest we may get to 
this ideal is to achieve mutually agreed inter-subjective mean-
ings, agreed to under the conditions that each individual’s con-
structed meaning only be communicated to others via texts sub-
ject to the same limitations (perceived underspecified textual 
signs and existing mental models).  This means that all word 
meanings are potentially dynamic and may be influenced by 
communication, subject to constraints in communicative norms, 
etc., but not to systematic features of the meaning. 
This problem was not a great hindrance to Saussure, who was 
mainly interested in the study of the abstract language system 
and not of actual communication.36  Approaches with more in-
terest in the cognitive reality and in the actual way language 
contributes to communication and mutual understanding, how-
ever, have had to take this discord more seriously.  One such 
approach, which is the one I will use as my basic descriptive 
  
 34. Id. at 19. 
 35. Id. at 13. 
 36. SAUSSURE, supra note 33, at 19. 
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framework in this article, is Connectionism.37  Using cognitively 
plausible and testable models, Connectionism shows how natu-
ral language communication functions quite securely without 
recourse to the characteristics presupposed by Saussure or the 
propagators of the Strong Theory of Language.   Connectionism 
attempts to resist presupposing identity of meaning systems 
upon the mental systems of communicators or presupposing a 
fixed set of symbolic rules.  In other words, what Connectionism 
wants to achieve is an answer to the question:  What would a 
model of the human language processing system look like if it 
enabled the kind of mutual understanding observed in real life 
to emerge, without presupposing identity of the processing sys-
tems?  
1.  Model of meaning construction 
The Connectionist model presented here has been developed 
primarily on the basis of work by Professor Herrmann et al. and 
Professor Graf et al.38  The Connectionist approach conceptual-
ises meaning as relations between words and concepts and 
among concepts.39  It states that understanding a word is equal 
to activating relations between different groups of knowledge in 
the brain.40  The model is primarily intended to show the simul-
  
 37. See generally, JAMES L. MCCLELLAND ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL AND 
BIOLOGICAL MODELS: PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING: EXPLORATIONS IN THE 
MICROSTRUCTURE OF COGNITION (1986) & JAMES L. MCCLELLAND & DAVID E. 
RUMELHART, EXPLORATIONS IN PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSING (1988).  A 
thorough criticism was formulated by Steven Pinker & Alan Prince, On Lan-
guage and Connectionism: Analysis of a Parallel Distributed Processing Model 
of Language Acquisition, 28 COGNITION 73 (1988). 
 38. Theo Herrmann et al., Die mentale Repräsentation von Konzepten, 
Wörtern und Figuren [Mental Representation of Concepts, Words and Figures], 
in BEDEUTUNG – KONZEPTE – BEDEUTUNGSKONZEPTE. THEORIE UND ANWENDUNG 
IN LINGUISTIK UND PSYCHOLOGIE [MEANING – CONCEPTS – CONCEPTS OF 
MEANING. THEORY AND APPLICATIONS IN LINGUISTICS AND PSYCHOLOGY] 
(Joachim Grabowski et al. eds., 1996); and Ralf Graf et al., Grundriß eines 
Modells der Aktivierung von Konzepten, Wörtern und Figuren [Outline of a 
Model of Activation of Concepts, Words and Figures], in BEDEUTUNG – 
KONZEPTE – BEDEUTUNGSKONZEPTE. THEORIE UND ANDWENDUNG IN LINGUISTIK 
UND PSYCHOLOGIE [MEANING – CONCEPTS – CONCEPTS OF MEANING. THEORY AND 
APPLICATIONS IN LINGUISTICS AND PSYCHOLOGY] (Joachim Grabowski et al. eds., 
1996). 
 39. Herrmann et al., supra note 38, at 120.  
 40. Id. at 127. 
File: Engberg4.23.04macro.doc Created on:  4/23/2004 6:00 PM Last Printed: 6/25/2004 1:36 PM 
1144 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:3 
taneous activation of elements from different knowledge groups 
that constitute a specialised meaning.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The model shows a stylised picture of different groups or 
types of knowledge involved in actual text understanding.  The 
intention is to monitor the state of the cognitive system after 
the meaning of a word in a specific communicative situation is 
understood, i.e., after interpreting a word in context.  The model 
works with four types of knowledge.  This stems from new in-
sights in text linguistics regarding factors influencing text con-
struction.  According to these insights, texts may be described 
completely along four dimensions (formal and grammatical di-
mension, thematic dimension, situational dimension and func-
tional dimension).41  At the same time, the model is in line with 
  
 41. See e.g., Wolfgang Heinemann, Textsorten. Zur Diskussion um 
Basisklassen des Kommunizierens. Rückschau und Ausblick [Genres. On the 
Discussion about Basic Classes of Communication. Retrospect and Future 
Perspectives], in TEXTSORTEN. REFLEXIONEN UND ANALYSEN [GENRES. 
REFLECTION AND ANALYSES] 16 (Kirsten Adamzik ed., 2000); KIRSTEN ADAMZIK, 
TEXTLINGUISTIK. EINE EINFUHRENDE DARSTELLUNG [TEXT LINGUISTICS. AN 
INTRODUCTION] 59 (2004).  
Functional / procedural
knowledge
Knowledge of 
linguistic means
Declarative
knowledge
Entire structure: 
specialised word 
meaning
Knowledge of 
situational 
conditions
(settings, 
users, …)
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the Connectionist theories mentioned above.42  Each corner of 
the model is to be seen as a single chunk of knowledge con-
nected to other single chunks, but at the same time every chunk 
is part of a network consisting of other knowledge chunks of the 
same kind.43  
Concentration will be placed on the way mutual and predict-
able understanding works in this model.   Therefore, I will not 
go into further detail of the different types of knowledge, but 
proceed directly to describing the processes connected to natu-
ral language understanding.44  However, it is important to note 
that the knowledge of situational conditions is special in the 
way that the chunks of knowledge of this type govern the choice 
of knowledge chunks from the other types of knowledge.45  This 
is a consequence of the concept of cognition always being situ-
ated, i.e., that we never interpret input from the outside world 
in a tabula rasa situation, but always on the background of our 
existing perception of the situation we are in.46 
The presented model shows the connections that are acti-
vated when a word is encountered and processed in a specific 
communicative situation.  The activation process means that 
the connection between two knowledge chunks is enforced and 
thus becomes maximally evident to the processing system.  
“Understanding” means creating a meaningful combination of 
connections.47  
Understanding occurs through one of three possible proc-
esses:48 
• Due to a routine: If the understander has already encoun-
tered the word frequently and recently in a similar context, 
the activation of the connections (or better: the re-activation) 
goes very quickly, as connections in the human system are not 
activated in an on-off process, but in an on-and-glowing-off 
  
 42. See infra Part 2.3. 
 43. See George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, 63 PSYCHOLOGICAL 
REVIEW 2, 92–93 (1956) (stating that knowledge chunks are considered “con-
stant for immediate memory”).  
 44. More details may be found in Jan Engberg, Dynamics of Meaning – an 
Under-Exposed Feature of LSP Linguistics, in LSP TRANSLATION IN THE NEW 
MILLENNIUM 31–36 (Peter Kastberg ed., 2003).  
 45. Graf et al., supra note 38, at 186–89. 
 46. DAN SPERBER & DEIRDRE WILSON, RELEVANCE 108 (1986). 
 47. Herrmann et al., supra note 38, at 120. 
 48. SPERBER & WILSON, supra note 46, at 114. 
File: Engberg4.23.04macro.doc Created on:  4/23/2004 6:00 PM Last Printed: 6/25/2004 1:36 PM 
1146 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:3 
process.  So connections that have not ‘stopped glowing’ when 
the word is encountered again are activated together, without 
a real construction having to take place.  Thus, these connec-
tions are preferred over potentially competing connections.  
Basically, high frequency of activation enforces the connection.  
This is a kind of top-down processing. 
• New construction: Connections may be constructed anew, if 
the combination is not previously known to the understander.  
This is a kind of bottom-up processing, because the meaning is 
constructed by combining basic elements on the basis of tex-
tual instructions and experience in the form of previous con-
nections.  Without wanting to go into more detail on this, I be-
lieve that due to this capacity of the human cognitive system, 
all texts, including, for example, statutory texts, are poten-
tially understandable for most language users, provided suffi-
cient basic knowledge is at hand in the system (= in the indi-
vidual) or available from outside for the system to draw infer-
ences.  The problem is to have the right kind of knowledge to 
be able to select the inferences intended by the sender.  I have 
performed a small empirical study together with Professor 
Wolfgang Koch that suggests the hypothesis may be right, but 
definitely more work is needed here.49 
• Modification of routine: The last possibility, fairly impor-
tant in connection with development of statutory interpreta-
tions, is that the model can also very easily cope with changes 
emerging, for example, because a more convincing argumenta-
tion changes the way a word is used.  This happens if a clash 
occurs between the routine activation and the input.  So 
changes may come about, for example, through explicit 
changes of meaning (corrections, guided change), through ex-
plicit changes inside the networks for procedural or declara-
tive knowledge (semi-guided change), but also through simple 
communicative experience of other uses than the familiar ones 
(non-guided change).  In the area of statutory interpretation in 
the EU system in focus here we have an example of a guided 
change in the form of explicit change of meaning.  We will 
have a look at the cited example in the context of the pre-
sented model below. 
  
 49. Jan Engberg & Wolfgang Koch, Inkrementeller Aufbau fachlicher Wis-
sensstrukturen bei der Lektüre von Fachtexten – eine rechnergestützte Pi-
lotstudie [Incremental Construction of Domain-Specific Knowledge Structures 
when Reading Domain-Specific Texts – A Computer-Aided Pilot Study], in 
SPRACHE UND DATENVERABEITUNG [LANGUAGE AND COMPUTING] (2000). 
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A Connectionist system shows both how understanding can 
proceed in a rule-like way, how we may understand things we 
have not understood before, and how we may modify our se-
mantic knowledge.  It thus shows under what conditions under-
standing (= meaning construction) may be more or less predict-
able, although no identical system is presupposed.  
2.  Statutory interpretation as  
a special kind of grounded understanding 
As stated already above, in my view statutory interpretation 
is basically a kind of normal human understanding and may 
therefore be described along the lines of models like the one 
presented in section 2.3.1.  However, there are also some impor-
tant differences between normal understanding in everyday 
conversation and statutory interpretation.  The question is 
what impact these differences have on the modelling.  Under-
standing is generally an automated and hardly monitorable 
task with lots of processing going on behind the scenes and lots 
of implicit knowledge involved.  This makes it almost impossi-
ble for us to describe in any detail what goes on when we un-
derstand what others say to us.  Statutory interpretation, on 
the other hand, is different in two important respects: 
• Statutory interpretation is a conscious process running 
along agreed lines: When interpreting statutes, a judge knows 
exactly what kind of activity he is involved in, differently from 
what he does when just understanding everyday communica-
tion.  Everyday understanding is an automatic process, statu-
tory interpretation a conscious and consciously multi-layered 
process, in which the interpreter tries to establish a consistent 
interpretation of a text. 50  The outcome of this process is some-
thing much more elaborated than what we normally connect 
with the expression “word meaning.”51  Jurisprudence in the 
  
 50. DIETRICH BUSSE, RECHT ALS TEXT: LINGUISTISCHE UNTERSUCHUNGEN ZUR 
ARBEIT MIT SPRACHE IN EINER GESELLSCHAFTLICHEN INSTITUTION [LAW AS TEXT: 
LINGUISTIC INVESTIGATIONS OF LANGUAGE WORK IN AN INSTITUTION] 162–68 
(1992) [hereinafter LAW AS TEXT].  
 51. Dietrich Busse, Verständlichkeit von Gesetzestexten – ein Problem der 
Formulierungstechnik? [Comprehensibility of Statutory Texts – A Problem of 
the Formulating Technique?], in GESETZGEBUNG HEUTE / LÉGISLATION 
D’AUJOURD’HUI / LEGISLAZIONE D’OGGI / LEGISLAZIUN DAD OZ 39–40 (1994) (dis-
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form of scientific work in the area of legal argumentation in-
tend to arrive at agreed interpretive principles for this con-
scious process and thus intend to delimit the possible out-
comes of the process in order to make its outcome more pre-
dictable than the understanding process in everyday commu-
nication.52 
• Statutory interpretation involves sources not normally con-
sidered for understanding a text: When interpreting statutes 
in legal settings the input is not just knowledge in the mind of 
the interpreter as in normal understanding, but also and even 
to a dominating degree a number of written sources like 
precedence, doctrine, statutes, legal commentaries, etc.53 
The differences are obviously important and the defining 
characteristics of statutory interpretation. However, as Profes-
sor Solan has already shown, legal interpretation clinging pri-
marily to fixed interpretive principles cannot in all cases fulfil 
the basic requirements of achieving justice without recourse to 
more subjective factors,54 so an element of more free and subjec-
tive interpretation has to be inserted.  This presupposes a 
weaker language theory than the one presented in section 2.2, 
and thus we are back at statutory interpretation being a sub-
type of normal human understanding.  Finally, this means that 
the model presented above may also be adequate for the de-
scription of statutory interpretation. 
3.  The weaker language theories 
The ideas presented so far are not alien to scholars of legal 
argumentation.  The literature, that will be cited in the re-
mainder of this section, has a number of approaches taking the 
position that normative texts are not normative (and thus do 
not have normative meanings) in their own right, but only as a 
consequence of the way they are handled in communication.  In 
the following we will have a short look at a small sample of dif-
  
cussing the outcome of the interpretation process as a complex knowledge 
frame).  
 52. Id. at 38–39; LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES 186 
(1993) [hereinafter LANGUAGE OF JUDGES]. 
 53. LAW AS TEXT, supra note 50, at 119–20. 
 54. LANGUAGE OF JUDGES, supra note 52, at 178. 
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ferent approaches, giving us an impression of some of the cen-
tral ideas in this line of thought. 
The basic assumption of the weaker meaning theories (a 
short repetition: meaning is not in the text, but in the minds of 
people, created on the basis of context, therefore not the text 
but the interpreter is in charge of legal decisions) challenges 
primarily the idea of the autonomous text with its context-
independent meaning presented in section 2.2 above.  This may 
seem a bit scary to some specialists in legal argumentation, be-
cause it looks as if it opens up for total subjectivity of interpre-
tation.  But in fact, for legal interpretation as such, the changes 
in basic assumptions do not necessarily present a major prob-
lem.  However, it does require that we give up the fiction that 
meaning is actually something objective and objectifiable that 
exists outside of communication and that we may therefore in-
terpret texts without recourse primarily to our individual 
knowledge base.55  Under the (empirically more easily justifi-
able) assumption that meaning is only present in communica-
tors, the task of the judge is actually not to discover what a spe-
cific word means, or what it may not mean, as is implied by 
such standards for legal argumentation as “the literal meaning” 
or “the plain meaning.”56  Rather the task is to decide whether 
the use of a specific word (and meaning) by a specific person in 
a specific situation and the consequent behaviour of the person 
is in accordance with the rule or regulation stated to be the ba-
sis of his action.57  This task might in the context of the U.S. le-
gal system be categorized under the heading of searching for 
the “ordinary meaning” of a word.58  The job of the judge in a 
court case is thus not to find existing meanings, but to decide on 
meanings, to end the meaning conflict between the parties and 
thus to establish the meaning most probably intended by the 
utterer.59  Such basic assumptions are in perfect accordance 
with Connectionist modelling: meaning is constructed by con-
necting knowledge units present from experience, either in ac-
cordance with a situationally agreed interpretation (ordinary 
  
 55. See, e.g., id. at 186. 
 56. Ordinary Meaning, supra note 27, at 3. 
 57. Christensen & Sokolowski, supra note 26, at 76–77. 
 58. Ordinary Meaning, supra note 27, at 3. 
 59. Christensen & Sokolowski, supra note 26, at 69. 
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meaning) or (if such an interpretation is not present, or if the 
agreed interpretation does not fit) in accordance with the input 
and the situationally agreed principles for combining argu-
ments in legal settings (instigated meaning).60  Meaning thus 
derives from input, from text, and from the mental system. 
As the reader will have noticed, the approach presented 
above, especially the version presented by Christensen and 
Sokolowski,61 is closely linked to ideas from post-modernism.  
However, the dynamic nature of post-modernist thinking and 
its focus on subjectivity and the absence of clear boundaries and 
structures is at odds with the way the field of law is conceptual-
ised in modern Western societies, where we emphasise the nec-
essary predictability of legal decisions and thus presuppose 
relatively clear boundaries and structures.62  The problem has 
been treated by different authors, of which we will look at only 
two, focusing on different solutions to the problem.  
First, Professor Solan’s interpretation of the problem and 
proposal for a solution.  According to Professor Solan there is a 
problem in admitting and expressing in court decisions that the 
common sense of the judge is the source of the court’s decision, 
at least in hard cases, rather than the words or some objective 
principles of interpretation.63  The problem is the fear of “a re-
duction in confidence that a rule of law governs the exercise of 
power by government” if judges admit that their decisions in-
clude a subjective component.64  Solan’s solution is to make the 
courts aware of the problem, particularly the nature of linguis-
tic meaning, and then suggest ways the court may establish the 
“ordinary” meaning of words, i.e., the meaning words have in 
actual communication.65  Thus, where Christensen and Soko-
  
 60. Sperber & Wilson, supra note 46, at 108. 
 61. See Christensen & Sokolowski, supra note 26. 
 62. See, e.g., THOMAS A.O. ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 17 (2000),  
[Deconstruction] exposes law to debate, but not to argument. It sug-
gests new possibilities of change, but allows no claim that the reasons 
in favour of a change are better than the reasons against it. It points 
out the privileging of ideas, but in cannot say what ideas should be 
privileged. 
Id. 
 63. LANGUAGE OF JUDGES, supra note 52, at 178. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Ordinary Meaning, supra note 27, at 13–18.  
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lowski totally discard the idea of rules as constitutive for lin-
guistic meaning,66 Solan looks for other and in his opinion more 
adequate ways of establishing the rules, compared to the tradi-
tional solution of relying on for example dictionaries.67  
A radical version of post-modernist thinking is deconstruc-
tion.68  In the deconstructionist view, the consequence of the fact 
that a word’s meaning is never fully determinate is that no 
meaning may be determinate.  Deconstructionists must always 
be skeptical as to the ideologies hidden behind all kinds of lan-
guage use.69  This view is naturally a challenge to legal think-
ing.  First, it is far from our common-sense view of language.70   
Second, it makes it impossible to rely on word meanings in any 
legal interpretation.71  Consequently, different approaches have 
developed various descriptions that make it possible to preserve 
indeterminacy as a scalar72 rather than a binary (determinate 
vs. indeterminate), or even one-sided73 notion (as all meanings 
are seen as indeterminate).  
We shall limit our discussion to one approach, the rhetorical 
approach to legal interpretation presented by Wendy Rauden-
bush Olmsted.74  One Olmsted example is the development of 
  
 66. Christensen & Sokolowski, supra note 26, at 68–69. 
 67. Ordinary Meaning, supra note 27, at 13. 
 68. “Deconstruction inverts whatever anything seems to mean, by revers-
ing privileging of one interpretation over another. Deconstruction is also occa-
sionally used in a wider sense as more or less equivalent to what is sometimes 
called post structuralism, or critical theory or even just theory.”  ENDICOTT, 
supra note 62, at 15. 
 69. Id. at 16, citing Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpreta-
tion: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formal-
ism, in DECONSTRUCTION AND THE POSSIBILITY OF JUSTICE 157–58 (Michel 
Rosenfeld & D.G. Carlson eds., 1992). 
 70. ENDICOTT, supra note 62, at 1. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Scalar is defined as “having an uninterrupted series of steps” or “ capa-
ble of being represented by a point on a scale.”  Merriam-Webster, Merriam-
Webster Online Dictionary, at http://www.webster.com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book 
=Dictionary&va=scalar (last visited Mar. 24, 2004). 
 73. Binary is “something made of or based on two things or parts.” Mer-
riam-Webster, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, at http://www.webster. 
com/cgi-bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=binary&x=15&y=14 (last visited 
Mar. 24, 2004). 
 74. Wendy Raudenbush Olmsted, The Uses of Rhetoric: Indeterminacy in 
Legal Reasoning, Practical Thinking and the Interpretation of Literary Fig-
ures, in 24 PHIL. & RHETORIC 1 (1991). 
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the term “inherently dangerous things”75 from meaning primar-
ily poison, guns, etc., on to meaning also defective automobiles.76  
This change is due to changes in the surrounding world, 
changes in the concept of danger, changes in the point of view 
as to what degree of security is necessary for citizens to feel 
safe, etc.77  It is the indeterminacy of “inherently dangerous” 
that makes it possible for the provision to be applied also in the 
new situation.  Yet, this capacity of development does not mean 
that the expression “inherently dangerous” is radically inde-
terminate.  Instead it is relatively determinate and relatively 
indeterminate.  This means that part of its meaning has been 
agreed upon to have a specific meaning (for example the notion 
of danger does not necessarily differ between the different uses 
of the word – this part is rather stable), whereas other parts 
have been agreed upon to be ambiguous or vague in their mean-
ing (for example the notion of a danger being inherent).78  The 
main point is that determinacy and indeterminacy are scalar 
and not binary notions and that they may be implemented stra-
tegically in, for example, legislative provisions and legal argu-
mentation.  In this view, the writer decides how determinate or 
indeterminate he wants to be, and this choice may be made on 
the basis of reasonable arguments.79 We find here again the 
urge to establish rules making interpretation predictable, de-
spite the fact that a degree of indeterminacy has to be ac-
cepted.80  In this case it is done by making determinacy a ques-
tion of agreement among language users. 
Scrutiny of weaker language approaches to legal argumenta-
tion shows that Connectionist modelling backs up post-
modernists’ belief that every understanding is an interpretation 
of a stock of subjective mental models.  However, the Connec-
tionist model also allows for situational knowledge chunks to be 
  
 75. As opposed to “things not of themselves dangerous.” 
 76. Olmsted, supra note 74, at 7. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 6–8 
 79. Id. at 1.  Similarly, Endicott (based on Hart) says that meanings of 
linguistic expressions may be best conceptualised as a core meaning and a 
penumbra; the penumbra being the area of indeterminacy.  ENDICOTT, supra 
note 62, at 8–11.  Only in penumbra cases is the indeterminacy relevant for 
legal argumentation, otherwise a sufficient degree of certainty is given for 
meaning to be indisputable and thus to at least function as determinate.  Id. 
 80. Ordinary Meaning, supra note 27, at 13–18. 
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planning chunks or dominating chunks.  Such chunks of knowl-
edge may be set up by agreement within an interpretive com-
munity,81 thus constraining interpretations within the relevant 
group of language users.  In this way, Connectionism may actu-
ally play the part of bridging the gap between the subjectivity of 
the process of understanding and the objectivity needed of legal 
interpretation processes in a modern society.82  It may thus also 
build the bridge between more post-modernist approaches and 
the above mentioned wish to set up ways in which legal inter-
preters might establish a rule-like ordinary meaning of a word,  
thereby providing practicing lawyers a practical tool for their 
decision-making rather than just placing them in the chaos of 
subjectivity guided by rationality. 
III. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN THE EU CONTEXT 
The characteristics and consequences presented in the previ-
ous sections are general characteristics of statutory interpreta-
tion.  They are particularly important when talking about legal 
texts in multilingual settings.83  The fact that not just one lan-
guage and one system of law is implicated, but more languages 
and more systems of law are involved actually multiplies the 
problems, as different languages and legal systems may present 
indeterminancies at different places.84  In the remainder of this 
paper, we shall look at the consequences of the presented mod-
els and approaches for describing the process of statutory inter-
pretation in the development of legal notions within a multilin-
gual legal system.  First, we shall investigate legal translation 
(the prerequisite of multilinguality in the EU legal system) in 
the light of the presented models.  This will be followed by a 
closer look at the argumentation of the Court in the case pre-
sented in section 2.1 in light of the presented model, including 
discussion of the applied principles of Connectionist modeling. 
  
 81. As suggested by Olmsted, supra note 74. 
 82. Objectivity stressed by, for example, Professor Solan.  See Ordinary 
Meaning, supra note 27, at 13–18; LANGUAGE OF JUDGES, supra note 52, at 
178.  
 83. Ordinary Meaning, supra note 27, at 2. 
 84. The EU is made up of twenty-five (including ten new member states) 
countries and includes Common Law and Civil Code states. Europa, The EU 
at a Glance, European Governments On-line, at http://europa.eu.int/abc 
/governments/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 17, 2004). 
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A.  Translated originals as a characteristic 
In the EU system, all official legal documents (for example 
regulations, directives, and judgements) have official versions 
in all eleven languages of the Union.85  Furthermore, all lan-
guage versions are seen as being equally authentic.86  This 
characteristic is achieved by translating the original texts into 
all languages and then declaring all translations to be authentic 
originals.87  For the courts, this procedure means that although 
all versions have to be treated as originals, in fact the process of 
translation is a determining factor for statutory interpretation 
in the EU system.  We will therefore start out with a look at the 
consequences of the weak and Connectionist language views for 
the process of translation.  
The most important consequence for the translation of statu-
tory texts is the impact it has on the object of translation.  What 
has to be translated, i.e., what the translator has to render in 
the target language, are not words with objectively fixed mean-
ings (specialised terms), but a text meaning constructed 
through the interplay of a number of linguistic features.  These 
features give rise to agreed, but not fixed, text interpretations 
among specialist readers.88  Every interpretation is inherently 
subjective, but constrained by the mental models built up by 
each member of the group through similar experiences during 
education, training and work in the legal profession.89  Thus, the 
interpretive history of a statute is a line of agreed interpreta-
tions based on argued subjective interpretations by the mem-
bers of the authorised discourse community.90  The translator 
has to render the agreed interpretation at the moment of trans-
lation.  At the same time, it means that it is possible to give 
  
 85. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 2, art. 53.  
 86. Id.  
 87. Anne Lise Kjær, On Legal Translation in the European Union: 
Problems of Multilingualism in International Legal Systems, in SPRACHE, 
RECHT, KULTUR. UBERSETZUNGSSTRATEGIEN IM NEUEN JAHRHUNDERT 
[LANGUAGE, LAW, CULTURE. TRANSLATION STRATEGIES IN THE NEW CENTURY] 5 
(forthcoming 2005). 
 88. Specialist readers belong to a group with authority to decide fights over 
meaning, namely lawyers in different functions.  LAW AS TEXT, supra note 50, 
at 120.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id. at 184–86.  
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multiple correct renderings of the same legal source text, as the 
agreed interpretation may be expressed in different ways all 
leading to the same result. 
This rendering of the original interpretation may be more or 
less easy, dependent on the correspondence between source and 
target legal systems.  In cases where so called “comparative 
concepts” exist,91 i.e., overarching concepts where one or more 
specialists in comparative law have asserted the degree of over-
lap between legal concepts from two or more legal cultures, the 
translation process is fairly easy for the translator.  This ease 
exists only so long as the translator stays inside areas consid-
ered overlapping in the source and target culture.92  One could 
say that what is achieved by establishing a comparative concept 
is a relative determinacy93 created by agreement among the 
relevant specialists (if the comparative concept is accepted by 
more than one legal specialist).  A situation in which the com-
parative concept is identical with all the underlying national 
concepts, i.e., where there is total overlap between the concepts 
from source and target culture, is fairly rare.  This is true be-
cause national interpretive communities rarely include lawyers 
from multiple legal cultures at the same time (apart from multi-
lingual legal systems like the Belgian or Canadian).  Therefore, 
what the translator may normally hope for is a comparative 
concept showing partial matches between the source and target 
concepts and a tendency among the senders of such texts to 
widen the overlap through international cooperation and 
through the impact of getting to know interpretations from 
other legal cultures.  In my opinion, comparative concepts as 
secured matches (albeit partial matches), safeguarded by the 
discourse community itself in the form of specialists in com-
parative law, are the ideal raw material to work with for the 
translator, primarily because of their being rooted in the legal 
discourse community.  Here we see one of the consequences of 
the presented model for the work of the translator: the transla-
tor must not just follow blindly the suggestions of the compara-
  
 91. C. J. P. van Laer, Comparatieve Begrippen voor Juridische Vertalers 
[Comparative Concepts for Legal Translators], 3 TERMINOLOGIE ET TRADUCTION 
65, 66 (1999). 
 92. Id. at 73.  This overlap is determined by the specialists in comparative 
law that are the constituency of the discourse community.   
 93. See generally Olmsted, supra note 74. 
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tive legal specialist, but find out whether the overlap in the in-
terpretations from the source and the target legal culture is 
relevant for the translation task at hand.94  As such, the work of 
the specialist in comparative law differs from the work of the 
translator.  The legal specialist scrutinizes the interpretations 
constituting the legal system, whereas the translator finds out 
what parts of the system are relevant in the concrete situation 
in order to create a picture similar to the textual interpretation 
of the source text in the target language and culture.95 
Thus, we can see that it is the inherent interpretive character 
of legal communication, as well as any other kind of human 
communication, that makes translation of legal texts possible.  
The interpretive character of language makes it possible for a 
reader in the target culture to interpret a combination of words 
in a text he recognises as belonging to translated texts that dif-
fer from the way he would interpret them in a non-translated 
text, i.e., without the constraints of the agreed interpretations 
within the national interpretive community to which he be-
longs.  It is because of this that the reader is able to grasp the 
different, agreed interpretations and thus learn what the writer 
of the original text has meant.  The fact, that this is possible 
provides substantial support for the viewpoint propagated here: 
understanding and  interpreting legal texts is not a matter of 
decoding objective meaning elements, but a creative process 
involving the use of existing mental models96 as well as the in-
clusion of input from the actual situation.97  The hardest task for 
the translator is to make the target language receiver use the 
process of modifying a routine or constructing his mental model 
anew, instead of just relying on his target legal cultural knowl-
  
 94. John E. Joseph, Indeterminacy, Translation and the Law, in 
TRANSLATION AND THE LAW, 8 AMERICAN TRANSLATORS ASSOCIATION SCHOLARLY 
MONOGRAPH SERIES 13, 34 (Marshall Morris ed., 1995). 
 95. C. J. P. van Laer, supra note 91, at 74.  Comparative concepts are also 
not decisive for a specific translation of legal terms.  Not the specialist in com-
parative law, but the translator decides eventually.  Like time and place, the 
text to be translated and the target group of the translation may be decisive in 
the evaluation of differences between a source term and a possible target 
term.  Id.  
 96. Including mental models based on agreed interpretations subject to 
change through argumentative fights over meaning within the discourse 
community.  LAW AS TEXT, supra note 50, at 120.   
 97. See infra Part 2.3 
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edge and his interpretive routines when understanding the 
source legal culture.98 
B.  The Argumentation of the European Court 
The European Court is special in two respects with regard to 
the translated originals discussed in the previous section.  As 
mentioned, the Court has to work on the basis of translations 
declared to be originals, which means that they all have equiva-
lent importance when deciding on meaning.99  Second, the Euro-
pean Court is an authority with special interest in harmonizing 
legal meaning.100  Due to the Court’s particular interests and 
role, it is necessary for the Court to determine one meaning 
valid for all language versions.101  These two factors have a ma-
jor impact on argumentation, as we shall see in the following. 
Let us now have a closer look at the argumentation of the 
European Court on translated texts declared to be originals.  
The argumentation in the case of the British and the Polish 
trawlers will be treated.102  The core of the case is the interpre-
tation of the linguistic element describing what trawlers do to 
fish.103  The argumentation of the Court runs as follows: 
Secondly, it should be noted that the phrase ‘extraits de la 
mer’ or its equivalent is employed in the Greek, French, Ital-
ian and Dutch versions of regulation no 802/68 and is capable 
of meaning both ‘taken out of the sea’ and ‘separated from the 
sea.’  Even allowing that the English version, which uses the 
phrase ‘taken from the sea,’ has the significance attributed to 
  
 98. Wolfgang Mincke, Die Problematik von Recht und Sprache in der Uber-
serzung von Rechstexten [Problems of Law and Language in the Translation of 
Legal Texts], in 77 ARCHIV FUR RECHTSUND SOZIALPHILOSPHIE [ARCHIVE FOR 
LEGAL AND SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY] 446, 456 (Franz Steiner & Verlag Stuttgart 
eds. 1991).  In order to cope with this problem, Joseph suggests that the trans-
lator should be noticeable as an author in the text, in the form of comments 
and stylistically awkward expressions, telling the receiver that he has to be 
aware of differences and that it is not possible to smoothly render all legal 
aspects of a source text in a target text written in a different language.  Jo-
seph, supra note 94, at 33–35. 
 99. See TREATY OF AMSTERDAM, supra note 2.  
 100. Id. § 15. 
 101. Id. §§ 9–15. 
 102. Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, supra note 8. 
 103. Id. § 15.  
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it by the United Kingdom (‘complete removal from the water’), 
the German version of the regulation employs the term ‘gefan-
gen,’ meaning ‘caught,’ as the United Kingdom itself acknowl-
edges, claiming that ‘it seems … to be an inappropriate term 
to use.’104 
The Court states that comparing the different language ver-
sions, three different possibilities are found: 
• Two senses are possible, no possibility is excluded (‘taken 
out of the sea’ vs. ‘separated from the sea’) (Greek, French, 
Italian and Dutch version)105 
• Only the first sense is possible (English version)106 
• Only the second sense is possible (German version)107 
This is a situation in which the different senses exclude each 
other mutually – there is no sufficient overlap between all 
senses for it to be possible to determine a common meaning on 
this basis.108 This is stated in the argumentation following the 
quotation above: 
Accordingly, a comparative examination of the various lan-
guage versions of the regulation does not enable a conclusion 
to be reached in favour of any of the arguments put forward 
and so no legal consequences can be based on the terminology 
used. Consequently, as the court has held on numerous occa-
sions, in particular in its judgment of 27 October 1977 in case 
30/77, Regina v Pierre Bouchereau (1977) ecr 1999 in the case 
of divergence between the language versions the provision in 
question must be interpreted by reference to the purpose and 
general scheme of the rules of which it forms a part.” 109 
In the first part of the argumentation, the failure of what 
might be said to be the default principle is stated,110 due to the 
lack of sufficient overlap between the meanings of taken from 
the sea, extraits de la mer and gefangen, respectively.111  The 
  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. §§ 13, 15. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. §§ 9–15. 
 109. Id. §§ 16–17 (emphasis added). 
 110. Id. § 15. 
 111. See supra note 15. Using the terms introduced in section 3.1, we could 
say that the Court establishes a comparative concept in order to find out 
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Court therefore uses a second principle apt for such a situation, 
namely the interpretation by reference to the purpose and gen-
eral scheme of the rules.112  Thus, the Court solves the conflict 
by creating a new meaning identical in all languages involved, 
overruling the existing differences in meaning.113  According to 
the Court’s criteria the result must be in accordance with the 
purpose of the provision (as seen by the Court) and it must be in 
accordance with the systematically surrounding notions, i.e., it 
must not create systematic breaks in the overall legal frame-
work.  
If we describe the original English meaning of the disputed 
lexical element (according to the English government)114 in the 
regulation in the model presented above, we get the following 
picture: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
where the overlaps or lack of overlaps between the different concepts repre-
sented by extraits de la mere, gefangen and taken from the sea are.  Email 
from Conrad van Laer, University of Maastricht, to Jan Engberg, Aarhus 
School of Business (Jan. 2, 2004) (on file with author). 
 112. Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, supra note 8, § 18.  
 113. Id. § 15. 
 114. The English version, which uses the phrase ‘taken from the sea,’ was 
interpreted by the UK as complete removal of the fish from water.  Id. § 15. 
For the purpose of 
defining criteria
[Fish]
Fish is only a product when it is taken
out of the water [position in system]
Entire structure:
Specialised word 
meaning
In a law
context
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This means that when an English lawyer uses the word fish for 
the purpose of defining the criteria for taxation, the declarative 
knowledge he connects to it is the knowledge that fish is only a 
product when it is taken out of the water. 
The meaning created on the basis of the decision by the Court 
looks as follows: 
 
This means that consequent to the decision reached by the 
Court,115 all language versions, including the concept referred to 
by the English word fish when used for the purpose of defining 
criteria for taxation, in an EU context contains the characteris-
tics of being a product when it is in the net of the trawler rather 
than solely after removal from the water.  The Court has set up 
a new declarative knowledge chunk116 and limited this chunk to 
the narrower situational context of the EU and not to all legal 
contexts.  The Court does not say anything about what the Eng-
lish word means in general (as in its opinion according to the 
first citation above there is a clash between the meanings of the 
different language versions).  Instead a new and specialised 
  
 115. Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, supra note 8, § 22. 
 116. See discussion of “declarative knowledge chunks” infra 2.3.1 
For the purpose of 
defining criteria
[Fish]
Fish is already a product when it
is in the net [position in system]
Entire structure:
Specialised word 
meaning
In an EU 
context
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meaning is created within the limited borders of the Court’s 
“linguistic jurisdiction”, viz., the cases influenced by European 
Law.  Generally, it could be a problem to have specialised mean-
ings different from everyday meanings, as this influences the 
intelligibility of a text and thus of a subject area.  However, the 
development of continental European legal systems like the 
German system have made it a rule to generally perform these 
specialisations of meaning in order to cope with the complexity 
of modern societies.117  In the area of legal communication it is 
nothing special to alter and specialise word meanings, although 
it is naturally not an optimal solution to give a lexical element a 
specialised meaning which has no connection to the way the 
lexical element is used in other contexts.118 
This process is not without critics.  A harsh critic of the ar-
gumentative procedure described above is the German professor 
of linguistics Petra Braselmann.  She attacks both the idea of 
all language versions being equal within the EU system (be-
cause this creates interpretations problems in which no version 
may be said to be the original) and the role that teleological in-
terpretation must come to play in such a system.119  Problems 
here are: 
• Different degree of specification in the different language 
versions (only partial equivalence) 
• Differences in the way different languages conceptualise 
the same action 
• The role that teleological interpretation must play in solv-
ing the problem120 
The first two objections have to do with the underlying per-
ception of meaning and the confidence the author has in the 
  
 117. LAW AS TEXT, supra note 50, at 189–90; Busse, supra note 51, at 44–46. 
 118. Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, supra note 8, § 11.  According to the British government, 
that argument was particularly relevant to the case.  Id. 
 119. Petra Braselmann, Der Richter als Linguist. Linguistische Überlegun-
gen zu Sprachproblemen in Urteilen des Europäischen Gerichtshofes [The 
Judge as Linguist. Linguistic Considerations of Language Problems in 
Judgements from the European Court of Justice], in SPRACHE UND LITERATUR 
IN WISSENSCHAFT UND UNTERRICHT [LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN SCIENTIFIC 
AND EDUCATIONAL SETTINGS]  71, 81 (1992). 
 120. Id. at 81–82. 
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possibilities of the human system to create meaning interac-
tively.  Her point of view is that problems occur because the dif-
ferent language systems involved have differences in the way 
they conceptualise the world.121  These differences result in an 
equivalence between the different versions which is necessarily 
only partial, thereby making it impossible after translation to 
work with such texts as originals.  I believe such an interpreta-
tion presents word meanings as more fixed and unchangeable 
than they are in reality.  At the same time, it is based on a dif-
ferent and more code-oriented view of translation than the one 
propagated here:  If the original text does not exist as a fixed 
entity, but only as a temporary agreement among the special-
ists as to its interpretation, and this interpretation is what the 
translator has to render in a different language, then naturally 
this may change over time and have different shapes in differ-
ent texts due to the different language systems and their differ-
ent conceptualisation of the world.122  Only, a static conceptuali-
sation of linguistic meaning has problems describing this char-
acteristic and acknowledging the process of translation in that 
way.  Therefore, such basic assumptions will tend to lead to the 
rejection of the possibility of a multilingual legal system.  On 
the other hand, conceptualising meanings the way I have pre-
sented above in 2.3.1 (and which seems to be in accord with the 
way real communication works)123 renders a multilingual legal 
system, with real multilinguality as its basis, possible.  If the 
meaning of disputed elements of every language have equal po-
tential importance for interpretation, if no wording of one of the 
versions has the capacity of overruling the others and if mean-
ings are inherently dynamic and sensible to communication, we 
may actually reach a really multilingual legal system.124  The 
  
 121. Id. at 73, 75, 77. 
 122. CHRISTIANE NORD, TRANSLATING AS A PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY: 
FUNCTIONALIST APPROACHES EXPLAINED 31–33 (1997); Jan Engberg, Legal 
Meaning Assumptions – What are the Consequences for Legal Interpretation 
and Legal Translation?, 15 INT’L J. SEMIOTICS L. 375, 385 (2002).  
 123. Herrmann et al., supra note 38, at 127. 
 124. Anne Lise Kjær, A Common Legal Language in Europe?, in 
EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE LIGHT OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 396 –397 (Mark van Hoecke ed., 2004).  Kjaer reaches 
a similar conclusion, stating that multi-lingual legal discourse with common 
legal texts is possible and may gradually “create a basis for a legal discourse 
across the different legal cultures and different languages of Europe.”  Id. 
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practical viability of such a system is a different topic that I 
shall not touch upon here, but as long as the European Union 
upholds the idea of multilinguality as the ideal of the coopera-
tion, this is the only possible solution.  In my view only a weak 
language theory like those presented above in 2.4 may ade-
quately describe why the system works today and why it may 
develop in the intended direction.  
Braselmann’s third objection is to the role of the interpreting 
judge in statutory interpretation. To Braselmann, statutory in-
terpretation in a multilingual context is only possible with un-
due recourse to teleological interpretation, which is problematic 
because of its subjectivity.125  She believes it would be better to 
use principles more closely linked to the wording of the statu-
tory texts.  However, this presupposes a strong view of language 
that is difficult to coordinate with what we find when we inves-
tigate actual human conversation.  Because understanding is 
the root of statutory interpretation, and because understanding 
can only be performed as a subjective process with intersubjec-
tive control procedures, every interpretation is and must be 
subjective in its basis.  Furthermore, every interpretation is a 
decision between alternatives.126  The important thing in order 
to guarantee control with the development is the explicit pres-
entation of the arguments.127  Indeed, subjectivity is a potential 
problem, but one that we cannot get rid of by going back to the 
words and their literal meanings.  This is not feasible, as the 
words have to be interpreted by humans in a subjective process 
in order to acquire meaning.  The problem has to be solved by 
taking the necessary subjectivity seriously and presenting the 
argumentative process behind the subjective process. 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES AND CONCLUSIONS  
What I have said and found may be summarised in the fol-
lowing three points: 
• Statutory communication and statutory interpretation as a 
specific kind of understanding may be best conceptualized as 
subjective interpretation on the basis of (partially institution-
ally) agreed meaning constraints, a number of explicit inter-
  
 125. Braselmann, supra note 119, at 82. 
 126. Olmsted, supra note 74, at 2. 
 127. Id. at 9. 
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pretation principles and a number of primarily written 
sources. 
• Practical statutory interpretation in a multilingual EU con-
text actually does not merely look for the meaning which 
words or phrases in the interpreted texts are normally con-
nected with (the ordinary meaning), but through communica-
tion in the group of specialized lawyers statutory interpreta-
tion in this context is at times equivalent to combining knowl-
edge chunks in a new way in the light of shared and agreed in-
terpretations. 
• Teleology plays a major part in such an approach, which is 
more strongly the case in an EU context but also necessarily 
the case in more word oriented interpretation.  This is a con-
sequence of the dynamic and interpretive nature of linguistic 
meaning, and it is a prerequisite for the efficient functioning 
of a legal system. 
The question is now what these results mean for prospects of 
a multilingual legal system like the European Union.128  It is a 
given fact, underscored by the branch of linguistics known as 
“Linguistic Relativity,” that what one language system concep-
tualizes in one way is not conceptualised in the same way in all 
(or even in any) other language systems.129  This is especially 
true of legal terminologies at a system level.  This fact has led 
some scholars to postulate that it is impossible for EU statutes 
to ever be read and interpreted in the same way in eleven dif-
ferent languages.  For example, the Danish linguist specializing 
in legal integration, Anne Lise Kjær, originally argued that it 
would be impossible to achieve a situation in which every one 
from Helsinki, Finland to Athens, Greece interprets EU statu-
tory texts in the same way — in the light of eleven languages 
and fifteen different legal systems — because natural language 
words are filled with historically grown meaning that may not 
just be taken away and substituted by new meaning.130  
Such arguments are true to a certain extent, but the impor-
tant factors are the time limits we set up for the process and the 
  
 128. See supra note 2.  
 129. A good overview of Linguistic Relativism is given in JOHN J. GUMPERZ 
& STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, RETHINKING LINGUISTIC RELATIVITY (1996).  
 130. Anne Lise Kjaer, Ret og Sprog i EU: Mangfoldighed, Sprogforbistring – 
og Graenser for Integration? [Law and Language in the EU: Diversity, 
Confusion – and Limits to Integration?], in RETFAERD [JUSTICE] 4, 14 (1998). 
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kind of process we suggest for reaching the goal.  As I have tried 
to show, stability of legal meaning found in a national context 
presupposes a certain division of labour between those with au-
thority and those without: Legal concepts within a national le-
gal system are stable because only a limited group of specially 
trained experts (primarily the judges) have the authority to de-
cide what legal words mean.  At least in the German legal sys-
tem, it is unlikely that every citizen without training or instruc-
tion would, e.g., interpret statutes the way lawyers have agreed 
to interpret them.131  So maybe the necessary level to reach for a 
legal system to be valid and efficient is not that every person 
interprets all texts in the same way without talking to anyone, 
but only that nearly every lawyer immersing himself or herself 
into the relevant communication process may be convinced that 
a certain interpretation is sensible.  In other words, the crite-
rion is whether agreement on an interpretation may be estab-
lished among the authorized experts in a clear way, not 
whether every one would arrive at the same interpretation in 
all situations.132  
If we look at the case described above in these terms, it 
means the lexical entity from the different language versions 
describing what trawlers do to fish will not automatically be 
interpreted in the same way, as the underlying language sys-
tems are different in the way they conceptualise this process (as 
shown in the argumentation by the European Court133).  One 
could say that even the ordinary meaning134 is not identical 
across languages and systems.  Thus, the criterion for fish to be 
products from a taxation perspective will differ according to the 
language version used.  If identical ordinary meaning were the 
ideal of the European Union, development of a multilingual le-
gal system would probably be virtually impossible due to the 
underlying differences in the language systems.  What is possi-
  
 131. Karin Luttermann, Wie Lang ist Lebenslang? Juristische 
Definitionssemantik und Allgemeiner Sprachgebrauch [How Long is Lifelong? 
Legal Definitional Semantics and Everyday Language Use], 27 DEUTSCHE 
SPRACHE [GERMAN LANGUAGE] 236, 245 (1999). 
 132. As will have become clear from the quotation in note 124, Kjær has 
come to the same conclusions in her recent work.  Kjaer, supra note 130. 
 133. Case 100/84, Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland, supra note 8, § 15. 
 134. See supra Part 2.4.  
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ble, however, is to set up a legal institution and equip it with a 
semantic power that makes it possible to create identical mean-
ings on the basis of input or on the basis of what meaning 
seems most sensible in the light of the overall purpose of the 
statute.  
The creation of meaning through a decision of the Court does 
not guarantee that the interpretation (and thus this new mean-
ing of the words used) will be generally accepted in the different 
states belonging to the EU.  The decision of the Court in the 
cited case does not in itself guarantee that the British govern-
ment is convinced.  What the Court does, in linguistic terms, is 
to take advantage of its authority to decide meanings within its 
limited context.  Whether the Court’s interpretation and newly 
created meaning are successful depends on the degree to which 
the argumentation of the Court is convincing and therefore ac-
cepted first by lawyers in this field and later by other fields of 
law and by other English speakers.  This process of widening 
the acceptance of a proposed interpretation is only possible via 
communication and argumentation.   It presupposes an open 
mind on all sides of the communication, including the possibil-
ity of convincing the Court that their new meaning is not a good 
solution.  Then again, this is the way meaning develops in all 
other contexts, so it is probably also a viable solution for the 
development of a legal system based on specialised word mean-
ings. 
A common European law may actually come about, not by 
dictating meanings, but by immersing the authorized special-
ists into communicative argumentation based on convincing 
purpose oriented arguments and gradually creating the neces-
sary common cognitive basis among lawyers working in the 
field.  This is to a certain extent revolutionary (as it challenges 
the idea of the Rule of Law as an overall principle of the legal 
system) and it will take a long time before the process has 
reached a stage where it can work without much communica-
tion.  Yet, I consider it to be the most viable way if we want to 
keep the European Union as a multilingual legal system, one in 
which diversity and the meaning potential of many languages 
are sources for new insights for those engaging in the communi-
cative game.  And it is Constructionist models that show why 
the human language processing system is able to work this way. 
 
